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ILLC / Department of Philosophy
University of Amsterdam
penultimate version
to appear in Linguistics Meets Philosophy, ed. D. Altshuler, CUP
1 Introduction
[N]egative judgments … are regarded as the jealous enemies of our unceasing
endeavour to extend our knowledge, and it almost requires an apology to win
for them even tolerance, not to say favour and high repute.
(Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason)
Speech acts can be correct or incorrect in that they adhere to or violate some normative component of
the conventions surrounding their use. A lot hinges on which assertions are correct. If assertions are
presentations of truth-apt contents, then we can draw conclusions about truth-functional semantics
from which sentences can be correctly asserted in which circumstances; if, as Frege (1879) sug-
gested, logic tells us which conclusions we may correctly assert given previously asserted premisses,
the study of correct assertion elucidates what logic is (Dumme, 1991); and if correct assertion is
intimately connected to knowledge, we can draw conclusions about the nature of knowledge from
the nature of assertion (Williamson, 2000).
None of these analyses of correct assertion, or their purported import, are uncontroversial. But
few doubt that an analysis of correct assertion plays a pivotal role in both linguistics and philosophy.
I contend that it is equally important to provide an analysis of rejection to say something about which
assertions can be correctly rejected.1 As a case in point, consider how disagreement data like in (1)
and (2) can elucidate the semantics of epistemic modals.
(1) a. A: e keys might be in the car.
b. B: (No,) you’re wrong! I checked the car.
(2) a. A: For all I know, the keys are in the car.
b. B: (No,) you’re wrong! I checked the car.
e contrast in (1)/(2) suggests that epistemic might cannot be paraphrased as for all I know, since (1a)
is correctly rejectable by (1b), whereas (2a) is not (von Fintel and Gillies, 2007). Arguably,(1a) and (2b)
∗I am grateful to Daniel Altshuler, Carloa Pavese, Luca Incurvati and the audience of the SPAGAD2 workshop held
by the ZAS, Berlin for their thorough and thought-provoking comments on earlier versions of this material.
1In my terminology, assertion and rejection are speech acts that correspond to the acts of positive and negative judge-
ment and/or the aitudes of assent and dissent, respectively. Some say that rejection is the aitude corresponding to the
speech act of denial, but such dierences are merely terminological.
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are correctly assertible in the same contexts, so do not dier in their assertibility-conditions. How-
ever, they apparently dier in their rejectability-conditions. Considering rejections reveals some-
thing that would be lost if we had only considered assertibility. Similar observations can be made in
other domains, e.g. disagreement about taste, morals or aesthetics.2
e jury is still out on what precisely we learn from such data. Surely, however, the jury will
benet from studying what it means to correctly reject something. Yet, the speech act of rejection
has been somewhat neglected (particularly when compared to assertion). is is one of Frege’s many
legacies. In his Die Verneinung, he argued that it is useless to consider rejection on its own terms,
as the job of rejection is done by negative assertion. On this view, rejection is a shadow thrown
by assertion—to not reduce it to negative assertion would be a ‘futile complication’ that ‘cometh of
evil’3 (Geach, 1965, p. 455). I will argue that this view is mistaken.
Beyond addressing the Frege point, the focus of this chapter will be on the notion of correctness.
Following Williamson (1996, 2000), it has become popular to characterise speech acts by the norms
that are essential for their correct performance. (But many of those who do not accept that such
norms characterise speech acts still accept that there are norms governing speech acts.) I am sym-
pathetic to this and in Section 4 will spell out in some more detail to what this view amounts and
respond to some of its critics.
However, the speech act of rejection seems to catch this normative conception of speech acts in a
dilemma. e argument, in brief, goes as follows. On the one hand, rejection is clearly also a norm-
governed act and thus should also be characterised by a norm.4 But on the other hand, rejection
appears to be the device by which one registers that some other speech act is in violation of its norm.
Such a device is needed in order to even start telling a story about how discourse is a norm-governed
activity.
us, we need to stipulate rejection as a primitive that is not itself denable by a norm. I argue
that the following characterisation of rejection will get the normative conception o the ground.
(Mistake). To reject is to register that a speech act has violated a rule of the conversation game.
Much of the appeal of the normative conception of assertion stems from the fact that it allows one
to characterise assertion without having to complete the sentence “to assert is to…”. However, one
nevertheless has to characterise rejection by completing “to reject is to…” as in (Mistake). While this
may appear to be a reductio of the normative conception, I argue that it is not.
Indeed, some version of the problem that requires the adoption of (Mistake) will likely aict
any proposal to dene what assertion is. In brief, the problem of the normative conception is that
we expect a norm-governed activity to come with a mechanism à la (Mistake) for registering rule-
violations. Hence talk of norms requires talk of rejection, so rejection is not itself characterised
by a norm. Other conceptions of assertion likewise explain what assertions are by appealing to
certain in-place frameworks (e.g. related to context updates or the undertakings of commitments).
Such frameworks, I argue, must likewise include rejection as a primitive, so one cannot give an
explanation of rejection itself from within the framework.
2is chapter is focussed on rejections of assertions, but data about the correct rejectability of non-assertoric speech
acts is similarly important. For example, one rejects imperatives most naturally by responding I will not, which appears to
reveal something about imperatives that cannot be read from their surface form (Geach, 1958; Kaufmann, 2012; von Fintel
and Iatridou, 2017; Portner, 2017).
3An allusion to Mahew 5:37: ‘Let what you say be simply ‘Yes’ or ‘No’; anything more than this comes from evil’
(ESV). See Geach and Black (1952, p. 125, note A).
4For further useful discussion on what such a norm could be, see Bussière (ms.).
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is chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, I argue that the study of rejection must
free itself from Frege’s grasp because rejections can be weak, i.e. there are rejecting speech acts that
are not reducible to assertions of negatives. Aerwards, in Section 3, I argue that rejections cannot
be reduced to assertions at all. e discussion there suggests an account of rejection as pointing
out norm violations. To investigate this further, I elaborate in Section 4 a story about how speech
acts can be characterised by their essential norms by comparing discourse to another rule-governed
activity: the game of chess. With these preliminaries in place, I further investigate in Section 5 what
the normative conception would have to say about rejection. I argue that rejection is subject to some
essential norm, but cannot be dened solely by that norm, instead requiring the principle (Mistake).
I conclude with some further commentary in Section 6.
2 Rejection and negative assertion
e seminal work on rejection is Frege’s Die Verneinung (1919). In what is today known as the
Frege–Geach Argument (Geach, 1965; Schroeder, 2008), Frege considers valid inferences like (3) and
two possible analyses in (4) and (5).
(3) a. If the accused was not in Berlin, he did not commit the murder.
b. e accused was not in Berlin.
∴ c. He did not commit the murder.
(4) a. Assert: If not p, then not q.
b. Assert: Not p.
∴ c. Assert: Not q.
(5) a. Assert: If not p, then not q.
b. Reject: p.
∴ c. Reject: q.
e analysis (4) straightforwardly explains the validity of (3) as an application of modus ponens.
e analysis (5) however is less straightforward. Frege stresses that the embedded use of not in (3a)
cannot be an expression of a negative judgement (i.e. a rejection) but must be a operator that modies
a sentence, not expresses a judgement about it. But this means that if we analyse (3) as (5), we need
a lot of machinery to explain the validity of (3)—machinery that was not needed to explain (3) as
(4). At least we will need some principle that establishes a connection between rejection and the
embeddable negation operator.
Frege does not deny that such principles can be found. He merely thinks it would be unparsi-
monious to have three primitives (assertion, rejection and negation) where two would do (assertion
and negation). By reducing rejection to negative assertion, Frege does away with the third primitive
and, he contends, when we can make do with fewer primitives, ‘we must’ (1919, p. 154).5
ere is however an ambiguity in Frege’s argument. He assumes that rejections are linguistically
realised by negatively answering polar questions (p. 153), but there are two possible ways to do so.
To wit, one can answer with a sentence containing a negation as in (6a) and by using a polarity
particle as in (6b).
5An early response to this argument is due to Kent Bendall (1979). Frege burdens the defender of a distinct speech act
for rejection with three basic operations—rejection, assertion and an embeddable operator not. As one only needs assertion
and negation, Frege concludes, rejection should be dropped on grounds of parsimony. But Bendall shows that one can give
a classical propositional calculus in which there are no embedded negations; hence one only needs to assume rejection
and assertion; so parsimony does not decide between assertion+negation and assertion+rejection.
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(6) Is it the case that p?
a. It is not the case that p.
b. No.
e ambiguity exists in the original German; the word Verneinung (lit. ‘no-ing’) can denote both the
act of responding with no (German, nein) and the negation operator in the logician’s sense. In Die
Verneinung, Frege appears to use the forms in (6) interchangably, but in the later Gedankengefüge
(1923, p. 34) he is explicit that (6b) is a Verneinung of p. In fact, the form (6b) is more congenial to
Frege’s discussion. When analysing (3), an important part of Frege’s argument was that rejections
cannot embed in the antecedent of a conditional. And indeed, negative answers to self-posed polar
questions do not embed like this: if is it the case that p? No, then … is incomprehensible, as noted by
Ian Rum (2000).
If one performs a rejection of some proposition p by puing the polar question is it the case
that p? to oneself and answering negatively with No!, then it makes sense to say that one performs
an assertion by answering positively with Yes! (Smiley, 1996). is is already observed by Ludwig
Wigenstein in the Investigations, paragraph 22.
We could very well write each assertion in the form of a question with an armative
placed aer it; for example ‘Is it raining? Yes!’.6
us, we may analyse assertions of p by considering uerances of the form in (7a); rejections of p
by considering uerances of the form in (7b); and negative assertions by considering uerances of
the form in (7c). is gives us a linguistic grip on investigating the relationship between rejection
and negative assertion.
(7) a. Is it the case that p? Yes!
b. Is it the case that p? No!
c. Is it the case that not p? Yes!
ere is an imprecision. Here, one uses the polarity particles yes and no to respond to self -posed
questions to perform assertions and rejections. But typically, we think of these particles as respond-
ing to other speakers’ speech acts—and we also frequently think of rejections as responding to other
speakers. is points towards another important distinction we need to untangle. On the one hand,
we can do logic by asserting and rejecting some propositions to ourselves and investigating what fol-
lows from this; this is Frege’s concern. But on the other hand, we can also use the same speech acts
in dialogue to, in particular, accept or reject another speaker’s contribution. Expressing a rejection
by negatively responding to a self-posed question is not per se unsuitable for this second purpose. It
is clumsy, but not incorrect, to reject (8a) with (8b).
(8) a. A: e accused was in Berlin.
b. B: Was the accused in Berlin? No!
ere is more to say about the dierence between rejections in solipsistic deliberation and rejections
in dialogue. I return to this in Section 5.
Frege claims that rejections are just negative assertions, i.e. that (7b) is to be analysed as (7c).
However, as incisively argued by Smiley (1996), Frege only succeeds in showing that not is not an
6My translation. Original German:
Wir könnten sehr gut auch jede Behauptung in der Form einer Frage mit nachgesetzter Bejahung schreiben;
etwa: ‘Regnet es? Ja!’.
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indicator for rejection, due to the fact that not embeds. at is, Smiley concedes that (5) is not the
correct analysis of (3). But, he continues, one may now ask whether (5) is the correct analysis of (9).
(9) a. If the accused was not in Berlin, he did not commit the murder.
b. Was the accused in Berlin? No!
∴ c. Did he commit the murder? No!
As before, this appears to be a valid inference and we should be able to give some explanation of its
validity. Frege could insist that for reasons of parsimony the two forms of Verneinung in (6) are to
be analysed the same, their divergent embedding behaviour notwithstanding. us, he could insist
that it is most parsimonious to analyse (9) as (4) as well.
Smiley counters that there is nothing unparsimonious about introducing additional primitives
(such as a conception of rejection distinct from negative assertion) if it accounts for additional data.
Smiley appears to think that dierences in embedding behaviour suce to establish that (9) is new
data, distinct from (3), that Frege leaves unexplained. But this could be seen as begging the question
against Frege. e dierence between (3) and (9) is acknowledged by Frege and it is precisely this
dierence that he seeks to analyse away.
ere is, however, additional data that gives succor to Smiley. Say that a rejection of some propo-
sition p is strong if it is equivalent to the assertion of not p, i.e. if instead of rejecting p one had asserted
not p nothing else would have been dierent. Call a rejection weak if it is not strong. Many accounts
of rejection have it that all rejections are strong. For example, according to Frege (1919), all rejec-
tions of any proposition p are strong because they simply are assertions of not p; according to Rum
(2000), from a rejection of p one can infer exactly what one can infer from the assertion of not p (in
the same context);7 according to Smiley (1996), rejecting p is correct if and only if asserting not p is
correct.
Enter Imogen Dickie (2010), who argues that some rejections are weak. Some of her examples
are in (10).
(10) a. Did Homer write the Iliad? No! Actually Homer did not exist.
b. Was Homer a unicorn? No! ere is no such property as the property of being a unicorn.
Dickie argues that such rejections cannot be strong, as, for example, if (10a) is interpreted as a strong
rejection, the speaker has performed a speech act that is equivalent to the assertion of Homer did
not write the Iliad. But this is not the case, as she would reject Homer did not write the Iliad on the
same grounds that led her to reject Homer wrote the Iliad. e same goes for (10b). Such data seem to
doom the Fregean project of reducing rejection to assertion—but they equally trouble Smiley (1996)
and Rum (2000), who still insist that all rejections are strong.
e Fregean has some room to manoeuvre. In a sentence like Homer did not write the Iliad because
Homer did not exist, it appears that the speaker does assert that Homer did not write the Iliad, but the
use of negation here is metalinguistic (see Horn, 1989). us, perhaps the Fregean can resist Dickie’s
argument from (10) by claiming that such rejections are reducible to assertions of negatives, if the
laer includes assertions of metalinguistic negatives. us, we might say that the rejections in (10)
are metalinguistically strong in that they are equivalent to an assertion containing a metalinguistic
negation.8
7Rum (2000) seems to assume that his account includes the possibility that rejections are weak; but Rum (2014)
concedes that this was mistaken.
8Calling such rejections/negations ‘metalinguistic’ is arguably misnomer (although a frequently repeated one; see
Schlöder and Fernández, 2015). Compare the following paradigm cases of metalinguistic rejections (adapted from Carston,
1996) with Dickie’s examples.
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But this will not do. Incurvati and Schlöder (2017) claim that one can reject out of ignorance,
which suggests to them the existence of bona de weak rejections. e following are cases in point.9
(12) a. Is it the case that X will win the election? No! Z might win!
b. is ticket has a one in a million chance to win. Will it lose? No! I don’t know that.
c. All I know is that the streets are wet. Is it raining? No! is doesn’t follow.
If we were to read the No! in (12a) as expressing strong rejection (in the non-metalinguistic sense), it
would follow that the speaker asserts X will not win. But the speaker claims something weaker than
this. Namely, that this might be the case (see Bledin and Rawlins, 2016 and Mandelkern, this volume
for additional discussion and data related to how epistemic modals occur in disagreements). In (12b)
and (12c), the speaker rejects a proposition since they are not in the position to assert the proposition
in question; but they are clearly not in a position to assert its (non-metalinguistic) negation either.
It seems far fetched to read such examples as ‘metalinguistically strong’. e following uerances
sound odd.
(13) a. It is not the case that X will win the election (because Z might win).
b. is ticket has a one in a million chance to win. It will not lose (because I don’t know that it will).
c. All I know is that the streets are wet. It is not raining (because this doesn’t follow).
It is dicult to read (or even coerce) a metalinguistic interpretation of the negations in these exam-
ples. Intuitively, none of (13a,b,c) have the same meaning as, respectively, (12a,b,c).
Hence, rejections such as in (12) are weak—they cannot be explained as being reducible or equiv-
alent to negative assertion. As these cases are not to be explained away by sorting them as metalin-
guistic, we cannot give an account of the phenomenon of rejection that would reduce rejection to
negative assertion.
Incurvati and Schlöder (2017) conclude that the most parsimonious explanation of all the data
is to accept a primitive operation for rejection that encompasses both weak and strong instances of
answering No! to a self-posed polar question. ey characterise this as the speech act that expresses
that one refrains from accepting some content and suggest that this is the fundamental function of
all rejections. Strong rejections, they claim, arise as a pragmatic strengthening of this more basic
function. A related proposal by Manfred Kria (2013, 2015) and colleagues (Cohen and Kria, 2014;
Meijer et al., 2015) is that responding no to an assertion is to foreclose continuing the conversation
in a way where the assertion would have been accepted (which need not mean to continue the
conversation in a way where a negative was accepted). ey call this denegating the assertion.
Be that as it may. Negation and rejection have sometimes been recognised as multi-category
phenomena (Geurts, 1998; Schlöder and Fernández, 2019) and arguments from parsimony do not
have the last word in this debate. An analysis of rejection in terms of assertion and two or more
embeddable operators to cover the various weak cases has not been ruled out. However, in the
(11) a. Did we eat tom-ah-toes? No! We bought tom-ay-toes.
b. Did we see hippopotamuses? No! We saw hippopotami.
c. Jane isn’t hardworking or brilliant; she’s both.
e speaker of such uerances takes issue with the form of the prejacent, but agrees with its (material, rst-order) content:
that they ate the fruit of solanum lycopersicum, saw more than one hippopotamus, that Jane is hardworking or brilliant.
is means in particular that they would not reject a rephrasing—an alternative form—of the same contents. is is not
so in the cases in (10). ere are no rephrasings of Did Homer write the Iliad? or Was Homer a unicorn? that have the same
content, but to which the speaker would respond Yes!.
9Example (12a) is derived from an example by Grice (1991) and has previously been discussed in Incurvati and Schlöder
(2019); example (12b) is adapted from an example by Williamson (1996).
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next section I expand on an argument by Huw Price (1990) to argue that we must admit a primitive
operation for rejection, this speech act fullls a need that cannot be fullled by any assertoric speech
act.
3 Rejections fulll a need
Price (1990) argued that the negation operator not is to be explained by appealing to a primitive
speech act of rejection (Price calls it denial, but this is a mere terminological dierence). e purpose
of this speech act, Price argues, is that it is a means of “registering … a perceived incompatibility.”
To see this need, imagine that we are members of a speech community that does not possess
such a means. en we could nd ourselves in the following unfortunate situation. You might point
to some berries, proclaim that these are edible and make motions to begin consuming some of them.
I, however, see that the berries are lilac and know that all lilac food is highly poisonous. Your death
would greatly trouble me, but I am not able to physically stop you—so I have a need to linguistically
inform you of the mistake you are making. What sort of recourse do I have? I could tell you these
are lilac! but you might not realise that edible and lilac are incompatible. en all I have achieved is
that you now believe that these berries are edible and lilac. Clearly, me telling you these are poisonous
is equally hopeless, as you may not realise the incompatibility between edible and poisonous either.10
As Price points out, even if you and I have a shared understanding of the truth-conditional se-
mantics of negation (e.g. by knowing the truth-table for negation), I could not point out your mistake
by uering these berries are not edible, since you might not realise the incompatibility of truth and
falsity (despite being a competent user of the language) and believe these berries are edible and not
edible.11 It does not suce that there is an incompatibility (such as between truth and falsity), I also
need to be able to inform you of it. Evidently, without you having an understanding of any relevant
incompatibility, there is no assertion I could make that would make you realise that you are mistaken
to believe that these berries are edible.
Of course, in our actual linguistic practices, competent speakers understand the incompatibility
of edible and not edible, so that I can point out such mistakes by asserting these are not edible!. us,
actual competent use of negation goes beyond the truth-table for negation: it includes an under-
standing of the fact that the use of not is registering an incompatibility (Price, 1990). Price claims
that the act of registering an incompatibility is rejection and claims that not is the expression of rejec-
tion. Taken literally, his suggestion of leing not directly express rejection falls prey to Frege–Geach
problem discussed in the previous section. e problem can be resolved by assuming a primitive
speech act for rejection and stating the meaning of not in terms of this speech act instead of the
direct expression of that speech act (Smiley, 1996; Rum, 2000; Incurvati and Schlöder, 2017, 2019).
Either way, the thought experiment suggests that we need to stipulate a distinct expression of
incompatibility. Although suggestive, such thought experiments may not be ultimately compelling.
e need for a primitive mechanism for rejection can also be appreciated by probing into analyses
of assertion, such as Stalnaker’s (1978). On his account, the essential eect of an assertion of p is to
propose to expand the common ground by adding p—and such proposals can be rejected. Sometimes,
Stalnaker is misunderstood to claim that an assertion immediately updates the common ground.12
10is example is inspired by Price (1998).
11Tangentially, this is why paraconsistent logicans, who accept the truth table for negation, but do not accept that truth
and falsity are incompatible, are also wont to stipulate a speech act of rejection (Priest, 2006).
12For example, Sarah Murray (2009, p. 324) aributes to Stalnaker the view that ‘an assertion updates the common
ground’ and contrasts this with other views on which ‘an assertion is a proposal to update the common ground’.
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But this is a strawman. Stalnaker is explicit that not all assertions result in a common ground update,
since they can be rejected.
It should be made clear that to reject an assertion is not to assert or assent to the con-
tradictory of the assertion, but only to refuse to accept the assertion. If an assertion is
rejected, the context [JJS: common ground] remains the same as it was.
(Stalnaker, 1978, p. 87, fn9)
us, an assertion does not expand the common ground immediately, but does so only in the ab-
sence of rejection. Put dierently, asserting that p proposes to make p common ground and making it
common ground is a further process that needs to be negotiated by the interlocutors (also see Clark,
1996).
Some have tried to prop up the strawman. Notably, Seth Yalcin (2018) ‘favor[s] dropping the
“proposal” talk entirely, holding instead that assertions simply always change the state of the con-
versation … Rejections of assertions do not stop the relevant changes … rather, they undo a change
that has taken place.’ His reason is that characterising assertion by appealing to a speech act of
proposing is just to ‘pass the buck to the question what proposing is.’ But any serious account of
speech acts must face the question of what proposing is (and of how proposals are rejected) anyway.
Consider the speech act of being. It is clearly mistaken to say that a bet is automatically accepted—
that is, the context is changed so that speakers are obliged to adhere to the rules of the bet—and that
to reject it is to undo these changes. is is mistaken, because rejecting a bet—that is, not accepting
it—is distinct from undoing a bet. Rejecting a bet is something I can do unilaterally, but to undo a
bet that both sides have agreed on usually requires both speakers to agree to this.13
us, if we want to make sense of being, we need to make sense of a mechanism by which
context changes are proposed and then either accepted or rejected. We can use the same mechanism
to give the Stalnakerian account of assertion as proposing context updates. is is not passing the
buck, but simplifying and unifying. Yalcin’s suggestion might simplify things if one is only interested
in explaining assertion (which may indeed be Yalcin’s ambition), but as soon as other speech acts
come into play, it becomes a needless complication to make assertion function dierently from other
speech acts that propose context changes whose rejection and undoing are distinct activities.
e occurrence of the word “reject” here does not immediately entail that Stalnaker’s account
must contain a primitive for rejection alongside assertion. Intuitively, one can reject by making a
counterproposal. at is, if you have asserted that p, I may respond by asserting that q, where q is
inconsistent with p. As the common ground must be consistent, p and q cannot simultaneously be
in the common ground. Hence, a story might go, my assertion is rejecting yours. But this story is
confused, as Price’s observations apply here as well. ere being an incompatibility does not exempt
us from needing a mechanism to register it. at is, one may not always realise that a proposal is a
counterproposal.
Reducing rejection to counterproposing faces another problem. To explain a rejection of a pro-
posal to update the common ground as another proposal to update the common ground may lead to
a regress with proposals stacking up and not being resolved. ere must be a mechanism to halt the
regress. at is, there is a need for a response to an assertion is not itself an update proposal. is
operation should register that one is rejecting an update proposal.14
13It seems to me that the same can be said about assertion. If you assert p I can unilaterally reject it. But once we both
agreed to p, it takes cooperative eort to remove p from the common ground. But I will not press this point here.
14Alternatively, a mechanism to accept a proposal that is not itself an update proposal. Either way, another primitive is
required.
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ere are dierent ways of spelling out this operation. Price (1990) argues that rejection signals
an incompatibility between truth and falsity; so roughly, rejection would be the speech act that
signals I am not accepting your assertion of p because p is false. But this fails to capture the data on
weak rejection discussed in the previous section. If the incompatibility between X will win and no,
Z might win is the incompatibility of truth and falsity, it would follow that no, Z might win means
that X will not win, which it does not. By adopting the Stalnakerian picture, one can x this issue:
rejection registers that I do not wish some p to be in the common ground. I may have dierent
reasons for this. I might not want p to be in the common ground because p is malformed, has an
unmet presupposition, there is insucient evidence for p, or indeed because p is false. is or a
similar conception of rejection is available to the gamut of accounts that characterise speech acts by
their context update potential (e.g. Roberts, 2012; Portner, 2018; Murray and Starr, 2018).
ere is another option to spell out a suciently broad notion of rejection, not requiring a
context-update framework. As said in the Introduction, not all assertions or rejections are correct
and some are incorrect in that they are violating some convention associated with these speech acts.
A good explanation of how speech acts can be correct or incorrect is that they are, in some sense,
governed by certain norms or rules (Williamson, 1996, 2000). (is can be said while leaving open
whether or not these norms are essential to linguistic activity or not.) Roughly following Brandom
(1983, 1994), one may think of these norms as being enforced by a social order in which violating
these norms makes one liable to social sanction. e relevant sanctions are social consequences such
one’s partial exclusion from the practice of assertion; e.g. the boy who cried wolf is sanctioned for
his misdeeds in that nobody heeds his assertions (Brandom, 1994, p. 180).
is leads to an understanding of rejection as the device by which one informs one’s interlocutor
that they have made themselves liable to sanction. Supposing that truth is a norm of assertion, if
you assert that the berries are edible and I know they are not, I judge your speech act as violating a
norm. By rejecting your claim, I inform you that you are liable to sanction (and, tangentially, death).
On such a conception, instead of saying that rejection is registering incompatibilities, it is more apt
to say that it registers mistakes.
Brandom himself does not consider the rules related to sanction to constitute the meaning of
assertion and rejection. Rather, the rules and sanctions surrounding linguistic behaviour constitute a
framework in which speakers keep track of each other’s commitments to certain contents, from which
certain permissions and obligations derive. Brandom then suggests to explain the act of asserting as
the undertaking of a commitment to the asserted content. is suggestion is taken up by Asher and
Lascarides (2003), Farkas and Bruce (2010) and Kria (2015), among many others. Aside from Kria’s
denegations, however, not much has been said about the role of rejection in such a framework with
a perspective towards rejections being possibly weak.
Recall that Price’s (1990) original argument was based on the puzzle of how we can inform some-
one that they are mistaken. e normative story outlined above would suggest that a mistake is a
violation of a norm and thus we may take rejection to register norm violations. is seems to hit the
target. Price pointed out that speakers may not realise certain incompatibilities, so we need a device
to explicitly point out an incompatibility. But we might equally wonder what would be required to
point out a norm-violation to someone who does not realise the appropriate norm. (I will continue
this line of thought in Section 5.)
I will now turn my aention on the normative conception of speech acts according to which speech
acts are characterised by the norms that essentially apply to them. Compared to Brandom, such an
account cuts out the middle man: instead of characterising commitment by norms and sanctions and
then assertion in terms of commitment, we may characterise assertion directly in terms of norms. I
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rst elaborate my preferred understanding of the normative conception of speech acts. Aerwards, I
investigate the prospects of conceiving of the essential function of rejections as registering mistakes.
4 e normative conception
It has become popular to characterise speech acts by stating the norms (or rules) that essentially apply
to them in the conversation game. A particular focus of recent debate are accounts of assertion that
seek to characterise it by identifying the constitutive norm of assertion—the fundamental rule that
governs assertions (conceived of as moves in the conversation game). One such rule is the knowledge
norm of assertion (KNA), proposed by Williamson (1996, 2000).
(KNA). One may assert that p only if one knows that p.
Other putative norms of assertion have been proposed (Lackey, 2007; Weiner, 2007), but it is not
the purpose of this chapter to adjudicate between them. Aside from the vibrant debate on which
putative norm is the essential norm of assertion, there is the aendant debate on whether a normative
analysis of assertion is possible. Invariably, defenders of the normative conception draw a prima facie
convincing analogy to games such as chess, rugby or baseball. But the dialectic suers from there
being insucient clarity on how exactly the activity of asserting is like a game. In what follows, I
elaborate my preferred understanding of how conversation is like playing chess. I use chess purely
for familiarity. It should be easy to see how analogous arguments using any other game can be
constructed.
It makes sense to say that the game of chess is made up by a number of rules: when we are asked
to explain what chess is, we explain that it is a game subject to a particular set of rules. One of them
may be wrien as (Rook).
(Rook). One may move a rook from square x to square y only if x and y are on the same rank or
le and no intermediate squares are occupied.
It seems that the question What are moves of a rook (in chess?) has no more satisfactory answer than
identifying among the rules of chess those rule(s) that specically or essentially govern the move-
ments of rooks. Namely, a move of a rook is a move that is subject to (Rook).15 en, analogously, the
question What are assertions? has no more satisfactory answer than identifying those rule(s) among
the rules of conversation that essentially govern assertion. To wit, an assertion is a speech act subject
to the norm of assertion (be it the knowledge norm or another one).
is analysis of assertion is not troubled by the fact that there are further rules of conversation
that govern assertion, but are not essential to assertion. For example, assertion—like any speech act—
seems to be bound by general rules of relevance and informativeness (to name just two). Likewise,
the movement of rooks—like other moves in chess—is bound by further rules as well. For instance,
the rule (Check) applies to all pieces in chess.
(Check). One may move a piece only if one is not in check aerwards.
But (Check) is not part of our understanding of rook moves. If someone knows the rule (Rook) without
knowing (Check) we would still aribute to them the knowledge of what rook moves are. Say, if we
15We may also characterise the rook piece as the piece whose movement is subject to (Rook).
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are teaching chess to someone, we would be satised that they understood what rook moves are if
they understood (Rook), even if we haven’t yet explained (Check). In this sense, (Rook) is essential
to the understanding of moving rooks, whereas (Check) is not.
Again analogously, a proponent of a norm account of assertion claims that it is only the specic
norm of assertion that constitutes the knowledge of what assertions are, regardless of other putative
rules of the conversation game that are less intimately related to assertion. Such rules stand to the
norm of assertion as (Check) stands to (Rook). Furthermore, there are broader behavioural rules that
apply to assertion (such as politeness or general morals), just as there are broader rules of sporting
behaviour that apply in chess (e.g. that opponents shake hands). As the laer do not seem to con-
tribute to our understanding of rook moves, we should not think of the former as contributing to our
understanding of asserting.
However, there are some doubts about the true extent of such an analogy between conversation
and everyday games and about how useful any such analogy is in characterising a speech act (Hin-
driks, 2007; Maitra, 2011; MacFarlane, 2011). One salient criticism is that a rule like (KNA) might tell
us under which conditions one may assert, but tells us nothing about how to assert, i.e. about how
to complete the sentence “to assert is to …”. Consider, for instance, the following rules that seem to
dene the move of short castling in chess.
(Short Castling 1) One may short castle only if (i) the king has not moved; (ii) the king’s rook has
not moved; (iii) the squares between the king and the rook are empty and not aacked; (iv)
the king is not in check.
(Short Castling 2) To short castle is to move one’s king two squares in direction of the king’s rook,
and the king’s rook two squares in direction of the king.
e rule (Short Castling 1) alone is not sucient for us to know how to short castle. We need to know
(Short Castling 2) as well. Now, it may appear as though (KNA) has the same form as (Short Castling
1). us, one may be inclined to conclude, (KNA) alone is insucient to characterise assertion, just
as (Short Castling 1) is insucient to characterise short castling (MacFarlane, 2011). It appears we
require another rule of the form to assert is to (…). But appearances mislead here. ere are many
possible assertions and many possible rook moves, but there is only one move called ‘short castling’
(namely, what is stated in Short Castling 2). e phrase short castling is a mere abbreviation for
this one move. Unabbreviating leads to the following rule for (Short Castling), which is properly
analogous to (KNA).
(Short Castling) One may move one’s king two squares in direction of the king’s rook, and the
king’s rook two squares in direction of the king only if the king has not moved; etc.
Nothing more than knowledge of (Short Castling) is required to understand how to perform the
move in chess that is known as short castling. If one knows (Short Castling), but not (Short Castling
1+2), one does not know that the move is called ‘short castling’. But such knowledge—knowledge of
the names of certain moves or pieces—is not required to play a game of chess. Likewise, one need
not know that assertions are called ‘assertions’ to partake in the assertion game (and few people use
the term regularly).
But this does not fully address the objection that on the normative account one cannot complete
the sentence “to assert is to…”. We have now seen that one can state the rule for short castling with-
out completing the sentence “to short castle is to…”, but the rule (Short Castling) still contains an
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unanalysed primitive: move. So, in explaining short castling by appealing to (Short Castling), one
presupposes an understanding of move; and in explaining (the speech act of) assertion by appeal-
ing to a norm of assertion, one presupposes an understanding of speech act. Shouldn’t we demand
explanations like to move a piece in chess is to (…) and to make a speech act is to (…)?
ere is a straightforward answer to this. We have no reason to suppose that there is any beer
explanation of move (in chess) than (Chess Move).
(Chess Move). To make a move in chess is to perform an act that is understood to be subject to the
rules of chess.
It appears to be hopeless to explain moves in chess by spelling out the form of an act that moves a
piece. ese forms vary vastly: one can make moves by physically moving pieces, by declaration
(“E2 to E4”), by sending a leer, or even by entirely mental acts (some can play a full game of chess
in their head). Moreover, one can perform any act that has the form of a move without playing a
game of chess. I can, for example, idly move pieces on a board and by sheer circumstance happen to
follow the rules of chess, but these idle moves are not moves in a game of chess. (Such observations
about intentionality are of course familiar from the literature on speech acts.) What does and does
not count as a move in chess is a social phenomenon. A move in chess is a sort of act that occurs in
a particular seing that is understood by everyone in it to be subject to the rules of chess. at is,
(Chess Move).
en, we may explain what it means to move a rook as (Rook Move).
(Rook Move). To move the rook in chess is to perform an act that is understood to be subject to the
(general) rules of chess and (in particular) to the rule (Rook), but not subject to other piece-
specic rules.
If we are happy with (Chess Move) and (Rook Move) characterising what it means to make moves
in chess, then we should be equally happy with (Speech Act) and (Assertion) being the explanations
of what it means to assert and make speech acts.16
(Speech Act). To make a speech act is to perform a (linguistic) act that is understood to be subject
to the rules of the conversation game.
(Assertion). To assert is to perform a (linguistic) act that is understood to be subject to the rules of
the conversation game and in particular to norm of assertion (and not to other specic norms).
Finally, another salient and frequent objection to the normative analysis of assertion aacks the claim
that a norm of assertion is constitutive of assertion. Defenders of this analysis countenance that an
assertion that violates the norm still counts as an assertion; e.g. Williamson (1996), who defends the
knowledge norm, explicitly allows that one can assert that p without knowing that p. is would be
an incorrect assertion, but an assertion nonetheless. Some think that this is nonsense: according to
Searle’s (1969) denition of constitutive rules, if a rule R is constitutive of an activity A, then one
ceases to A when one violates R.
16It is well known that to explain assertions by their form—e.g. by describing what kind of sentences are used to perform
assertions—is hopeless (Cappelen, 2011). e possible forms of assertions are too manifold to be easily subsumed under a
single description and I can go through the motions of any possible form without asserting. is is analogous to why it is
hopeless to try to describe moves in chess by their form.
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Ishani Maitra (2011) oers the useful clarication that only agrant violations of R result in a
cessation of A, but argues further that this does not resolve the complaint, as there are speech acts
that appear to be assertions despite agrantly violating a norm of assertion (e.g. a defendant asserting
their innocence in the face of denitive condemning evidence). e claim that any putative norm of
assertion is constitutive of the speech act of assertion is apparently incompatible with the claim that
speech acts that agrantly violate that norm can still count as assertions (Hindriks, 2007).
e complaint has bite if we understand constitutive like Searle does. But this is not the deni-
tion that defenders of the normative conception have in mind. Williamson (1996, p. 491) remarks
that “[w]hen one breaks a rule of a game, one does not thereby cease to be playing that game.” In
(Assertion), I suggest to dene assertions as those linguistic acts that are understood to be subject to
some rules. Certainly, an act can be understood to be subject to some rules despite violating them.
As a maer of fact, this is the case in chess. Plainly, one can speak of illegal moves in chess; the
FIDE Laws of Chess do so in Article 7.4. us, if we agree that the notion of move in chess is dened
by a set of rules, we must accept that there are acts that can be called moves in chess albeit violating
one or more of these rules. Otherwise, the very term illegal move would be unintelligible. Making an
illegal move does not end a game. Rather, if and once the violation becomes apparent, one would be
requested to undo the move. (Which appears to be analogous to the request to retract an assertion
made in violation of a norm of assertion.) us, if (Rook) is a constitutive rule, constitutive rules are
violable.
Some have denied the antecedent of this conditional: Hindriks (2007), for instance, claims that
the rules that dene the legal moves of chess, like (Rook), are merely regulative. But now, we are
merely arguing about the semantics of constitutive. Plainly, a rule like (Rook) is part of the rules that
dene the game of chess—that make up the game. If we are playing a game that is not subject to
(Rook), but instead subject to, say, (Rook’), we are not playing chess.
(Rook’). One may move a rook from square x to square y only if there is exactly one square in
between x and y.
We may insist on a particular, technical understanding of the term constitutive according to which
rules like (Rook) are not constitutive of chess. But this would not change the fact that (Rook) is one
of the rules that dene what the game of chess is. Whether or not one is inclined to call such rules
“constitutive” is besides the point. One also may want to say that it is constitutive of chess that
(Rook) is a regulative rule. I wouldn’t object to this, though it strikes me as spurious.
In any case, there is no objection against the normative conception to be found in the observation
that one can make assertions violating a norm of assertion. is is because, as shown by the example
of chess, violable rules like (Rook) can have the status of denitions. But, as I will argue next, the
fact that there are such violable rules entails that rejection has a central place within the normative
conception.
5 Rejection in the normative conception
e dialectic in this section, in brief, will go as follows. If you accept that conversation is a rule-
governed activity like chess, you have to acknowledge the existence of illegal moves (as argued
towards the end of the last section). at is, moves that are part of an activity (performing them does
not end the activity), but are violating some of the rules that dene the activity. But this means that
such an activity must also have rules that determine what happens in such a situation—rules that
13
govern how to proceed when an illegal move has been made. Based on the discussion in Section 3,
this includes, at the very least, a device to register that an illegal move has been made: that device is
rejection. However, I will argue, such a device cannot itself be characterised by a norm.
e need for rejection is particularly visible in learning scenarios. If the norms of the language
game are part of the fabric of our social lives, newcomers to our community should learn them.
Suppose that assertion is properly characterised by (KNA).17 Some language learner might assert
that p, i.e. make an act that is understood to be subject to certain social norms (even though the
learner has not fully grasped these norms), but a competent speaker does not believe that the learner
knows that p. She might point that out by saying you don’t know that p. If rejections do not register
norm-violations, nothing would stop the learner from assuming that they properly asserted that p
and that, in addition, they do not know that p. To make her realise her mistake, a mistake must be
registered by the rejection.18 It does not maer whether one performs the rejection verbally or by
intonation or body language etc. e point is just that this registering signal, however it is sent, is
not explainable by appealing to an account of assertion.
Now, someone endorsing the normative conception of speech acts wants to characterise speech
acts by their essential norms, e.g. characterising assertion by the (KNA). Can this be done for rejec-
tion? Based on what we have seen about rejection so far, the following norm appears to be a good
candidate.
(Rejection). One must: reject a speech act s only if the performance of s violated a norm.
ere is a lot to like about (Rejection). Conceivably, asserting p is in violation of some norm if:
some presupposition of p is not met (10a); or p uses nonexistent properties (10b); of the speaker has
insucient evidence p (12). us, (Rejection) appears to be broad enough to capture the data from
Section 2.19
e norm (Rejection) also accounts for the puzzle discussed in Section 3. e puzzle was that if
you assert these berries are edible and I respond no, they are lilac, you may not realise that edible and
lilac are incompatible, thus forming the belief that the berries are edible and lilac and proceed with
consuming them. e solution was to say that rejection registers that what I said is incompatible
with what you said. is incompatibility is in particular registered if we conceive of rejections as
being governed by (Rejection). For then your claim that these berries are edible and my claim that no,
they are lilac cannot both be correctly performed. Either your assertion was correct, in which case
my rejection violated (Rejection). Or my rejection was correct, in which case your assertion violated
the norm of assertion. But we cannot both be right, so you have no reason to believe that the berries
are edible and lilac.
e norm (Rejection) also accounts for the fact that non-assertoric speech acts can be rejected as
well. Supposedly, these speech acts are also explained by the norm that is essential to their correct
performance. For example, supposing that it is (part of) the norm of questions that one may not ask
questions to which one knows the answer, I may reject a question by You know that!. In general,
17Any other norm would allow analogous arguments.
18One may aempt to make her realise her mistake by saying that you shouldn’t say that! but this is hardly instructive—it
does not tell the learner what her mistake was. Uerances like you shouldn’t say that because you don’t know it might to
the trick, but they hardly seem like the kind of data a language learner is routinely exposed to.
19If you want to capture metalinguistic rejections like (11)—those objecting to form, not to content—under the umbrella
of the norm of rejection, mispronunciations etc will count as mistakes as well. Whether this is the case depends on how
the general norms of the language game are spelled out.
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then, (Rejection) entails that a speech act s and a speech act rejecting s can not be both correct. is
is as it should be.
A particularly interesting cases are rejections of other rejections. If you perform some speech
act and I reject it, you need not give in. You can reject my rejection (Schlöder et al., 2017). e norm
(Rejection) accounts for that fact. If I reject your speech act, then my rejection was correct if you
violated a norm. But of course, if you think that you did not violate any norms, you may reject my
rejection. According to (Rejection), your rejection of my rejection is correct if and only if your initial
speech act was correct. is is also as it should be.
Finally, although we naturally think of rejections was being in response to other speech acts,
there is a coherent notion of rejecting a proposition that is not in response to anything (see Section
2). We can extract the correct norm for these rejections from (Rejection). To wit, we may think of
rejections of propositions as governed by (P-Rejection).20
(P-Rejection). One must: reject p only if asserting p would violate a norm.
Note that there is an asymmetry here. I can properly P-reject those propositions that I cannot prop-
erly assert; but I can properly reject your assertion of a proposition if you cannot properly assert
them. is means that there are cases where you can properly assert a proposition p that I can prop-
erly P-reject. is is also as it should be, since you may have more information than I do. If you know
p but I do not, I can correctly P-reject p. But, if you assert p, me rejecting this assertion would be
incorrect. Moreover, your assertion grants me license to assert p to others based on your authority
(Brandom, 1983); thus aer you properly assert p to me, I am no longer able to properly P-reject p.
All of this sounds good. And yet, if you accept the normative conception of speech acts elaborated
in Section 4, you should not endorse (Rejection) as dening the speech act of rejection. I argued that
rejection—as the device that points out mistakes—is required for language learners to acquire the
right norms. I need to be able to register a norm violation even if you do not realise the norms of the
speech acts we are using. is is analogous to Price’s story in which I need to be able to register an
incompatibility even if you do not realise any incompatibilities. Saying that rejection is the speech act
governed by (Rejection) does not fulll this purpose, since if you do not yet understand (Rejection),
and this is the norm that characterises rejection, my rejections would fail to register with you that
there was a mistake.
Hence, having an understanding of rejection as a mistake-registering device is prior to charac-
terising speech acts by their essential norms. Characterising rejection by (Rejection) presupposes
an understanding of mistakes and how to register them—an understanding of rejection. at is a
vicious regress. e point is quite simple: if our social fabric is (partially) made up by certain rules, I
need to be able to point out which behaviour is sanctionable so that a newcomer can sort good from
bad behaviour. Clearly, my method of pointing that out cannot itself be dened by a rule that needs
to be learned this way.
us, there is at least one speech act—rejection—that cannot be characterised by appealing to an
essential norm. Does this doom the normative conception? I think not. But someone endorsing this
conception needs to acknowledge that the registration of mistakes is a fundamental and unanalysable
part of norm-governed activities. at is, we should accept (Mistake).
20In some sense, (P-Rejection) matches the Smileian reductio principle endorsed by the bilateralists Smiley (1996), Rum
(2000) and Incurvati and Schlöder (2017): if in the hypothetical situation in which you assert p, you can derive ⊥, it follows
that you reject p. But this match is not exact: ⊥ registers a specic kind of mistake has been—a logical one. Bilateralists
do not derive ⊥ from p and I do not know that p, even if they accept the knowledge norm (Incurvati and Schlöder, 2019).
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(Mistake). To reject is to register that a speech act has violated a rule of the conversation game.
With (Mistake) in place, we can then also adopt the norm (Rejection) to explain the data discussed
in this paper. e situation is somewhat curious: I maintained that the speech act of assertion is
governed by a permissive norm and that it is useless, possibly hopeless, to ask how to nish the
sentence ‘to assert is to…’ beyond saying that assertions are acts understood to be subject to certain
norms. But for the speech act of rejection, we appear to require the more substantive principle
(Mistake).
I think this is a bullet to bite. e registration of mistakes seems to be a fundamental part of any
rule-governed activity. In any game we play, we will at some point want to register a mistake. But
we do not expect the rules of the game to explain to us what it is to register a mistake, only how to
proceed once a mistake has been registered.21 We simply understand that a way to register mistakes
is part of the fact that there are rules. is means that the speech act of rejection is on the same
conceptual level as the concept of a norm or rule.
In fact, it seems that some version of this problem—the need to stipulate a fundamental principle
for rejection—occurs in any aempt to characterise speech acts. In Section 3, I outlined how rejection
appears in the Stalnakerian account of assertion. I argued that rejection cannot be reduced to some
version of the fundamental operation of updating the context, but needs to be taken as a primitive
that governs such updates. is is analogous to the situation for the normative conception: rejection
cannot be reduced to some version of the fundamental principle of a permissive norm, but must be
taken as a primitive that governs these norms. Similarly, Brandom (1994), as anticipated in Section
3, also cannot explain rejection (as the act that points out that someone is liable to sanction) in
terms of commitment but needs to take it as a fundamental operation that is part of the mechanisms
surrounding commitment.
6 Conclusion
e purpose of this chapter is to win some repute for rejection as a sui generis speech act whose
study should be of interest to linguists and philosophers. My main goal is to establish that rejection
is not reducible to assertion by arguing (i) that there are rejections that are not equivalent to negative
assertions; and (ii) that the speech act of rejection fullls a particular purpose—registering mistakes—
that cannot be met by assertoric speech acts. e most natural explanation of what it means to
register a mistake is that it is to point out the violation of a norm. is supports the idea to explain
speech acts by determining the norms that essentially apply to them.
Importantly (and curiously), however, the speech act of rejection cannot itself be dened by
an essential norm, as the act of registering mistakes must be prior to the norm that governs when
mistakes may be registered. I do not take this to refute the project of characterising speech acts by
their norm—rather, this seems to reveal the fundamentality of rejection in linguistic practice. e
arguments I presented here suggest that rejection is similarly fundamental in other conceptions of
speech acts, although I have not given them as much aention as the normative conception.
21Some games might have particular procedures for how to register a mistake, but this is not an explanation of what it
is to register a mistake, which is a concept presupposed by there being rules.
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Frege, Golob. 1923. Gedankengefüge. Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, 3(1), 36–51.
Geach, Peter T. 1958. Imperative and deontic logic. Analysis, 18(3), 49–56.
Geach, Peter T. 1965. Assertion. e Philosophical Review, 74(4), 449–465.
Geach, Peter omas, and Black, Max (eds). 1952. Translations from the philosophical writings of
Golob Frege. Basil Blackwell Oxford.
Geurts, Bart. 1998. e mechanisms of denial. Language, 74(2), 274–307.
17
Grice, H Paul. 1991. Studies in the Way of Words. Harvard University Press.
Hindriks, Frank. 2007. e status of the knowledge account of assertion. Linguistics and Philosophy,
30(3), 393–406.
Horn, Laurence. 1989. A Natural History of Negation. University of Chicago Press.
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